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ABSTRACT 
Asymmetric threats pose increasing challenges to the United States Navy in littoral 
environments.  To address the Navy’s need for a new platform to serve in this area, the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was designed and put into service.   What still has yet to be 
determined is what surface-to-surface capability the LCS will have as well as what air-to-
surface capability the LCS helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) will have.  
This study uses freely available data to build a simulation utilizing an agent-based 
modeling platform known as MANA.  The simulation is exercised over a broad range of 
different weapon systems types with their capabilities ranged across the spectrum of 
possibilities based on their effectiveness as well as potential difficulties in targeting small 
boat threats.  Using linear regression and partition trees, an analysis is performed on the 
resulting dataset to address the research question. 
The results show that the NLOS system is the best surface-to-surface missile 
system for the LCS as long as the expected rate of fire is obtained.  The best air-to-
surface missile system is either APKWS or LOGIR, depending on which can obtain a 
rate of fire of one missile every nine seconds or faster.  Lastly, the rate of fire has been 
shown to be the most important factor in determining the effectiveness of the different 
missiles.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
With the ending of the Cold War, the United States Navy is seeing its mission 
change.  Gone are the days of the threat of an engagement with a large blue water navy as 
represented by the Soviet Navy.  Today’s challenge is from smaller nations that employ 
diesel submarines, fast missile armed patrol boats, and shore-based cruise missiles in an 
attempt to deny access to U.S. forces.  Another new threat is the development of more 
capable unmanned remote control aircraft, boats, and submersibles.  The Navy realized 
that to counter these threats would require a ship capable of operating in the littoral 
environment and able to incorporate these newer unmanned technologies.  This resulted 
in the design of the modular, focused, mission platform known as the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS); see Figure 1 and Figure 2.     
 
Figure 1.   LCS-1, First ship of the Lockheed Martin Design (From Jane’s, 2010) 
 2
 
Figure 2.   LCS-2, First ship of the General Dynamics Design (From Jane’s, 2010) 
The LCS has several different mission modules that give it the ability to be 
utilized in a specific warfare area.  These modules are the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW), and Surface Warfare (SUW).    
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis looks at a LCS equipped with the SUW module and with an embarked 
aircraft and attempts to see how the LCS handles itself in an over-the-horizon surface 
engagement against missile-armed patrol boats.  The following questions guide this 
research: 
• What surface-to-surface missile should LCS equip? 
• What type of air-to-surface missiles should the aircraft be equipped with 
to be the most effective? 
• What factor is more important in determining the type of missile to select? 
This thesis uses simulation models, data analysis, and other analytical tools to 
investigate these questions and determine which combination of missiles and aircraft 
provides for the best overall SUW package.  The simulation model utilizes a given littoral 
region and threats that may exist in that area.   
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C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis provides the U.S. Navy analytical support for the customization of the 
SUW module package for the LCS.  Additionally, this study provides insight into the 
comparative capabilities of different air-to-surface missiles as well as an insight into 
which missiles will offer more ‘bang for the buck.’     
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE DOCUMENT 
Chapter II consists of the literature review, exploring the background and 
capabilities of the platforms and missiles used in this thesis.  Chapter III describes the 
modeling tool used in this thesis and the reasoning for selecting it.   Chapter IV describes 
the design of the experiment with respect to behaviors of simulated entities and creation 
of the scenarios.  Chapter V contains analysis and conclusions as well as 
recommendations for future work.    
 4
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the current threats and deficiencies within the U.S. Navy that 
have necessitated the launching of the LCS class.   
Operating in the littoral presents a complex collection of challenges. As 
…From the Sea put it, the “mastery of the littoral should not be 
presumed.” …From the Sea recognized that “Some littoral threats–
specifically mines, sea-skimming cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic 
missiles–tax the capabilities of our current systems and force structure.” In 
the past decade, swarming small boats (armed with short range missiles or 
a payload of explosives) and diesel submarines have also been cited by the 
Navy as obstructing U.S. access to the littoral. These systems enable even 
relatively unsophisticated adversaries to adopt a strategy of anti-access 
and area denial (A2/AD), whereby the defender seeks to prevent the 
attacker from bringing strike power to bear with a layered, but not 
symmetric force-on-force, defense of the approaches (Long/Johnson 
2007).  
B. LCS PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
1. History 
Faced with new threats in the littoral region, pictured below in Figure 3, the Navy 
strategy initially focused on avoiding the littoral and projecting power over the littorals 
using gunfire, missiles, and air power delivered by platforms already in service in the 
fleet.  This would minimize exposure to mines and land-based anti-ship missiles.  This 
strategy of avoiding the littoral resulted in the DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer program 
which the primary mission foreseen to be to support ground forces.  Over time, however, 
elements within the Navy begin to recognize the difficulty of supporting ground forces 
without a more persistent presence within the littoral environment and proposed filling 
this gap with new, small surface combatants.  Recognition of this difficulty was furthered 
by a 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report which indicated that the Navy’s 
shipbuilding program was facing a significant fiscal challenge and that if the Navy was to 
meet its force structure goal then it would have to either buy less expensive ships or 
spend more.  The suggestion from GAO to the Navy was to consider cheaper ships that 
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would be tailored to perform only one or two missions.  This cause was furthered by the 
Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group (SSG), which recommended that the 
two most important attributes for the future fleet were for distributed combat power, 
achievable through use of unmanned vehicles and offboard sensors, and modularity to 
provide mission flexibility (Long/Johnson 2007).  What finally caused the Navy to act on 
this need was the release of a report by the GAO in 2001 citing the need for improved 
war-fighting capabilities in the littoral region (GAO 2001).  The Navy launched a study 
in 2001 to find the ship that would address all of its needs for a littoral capable warship.  
The Navy decided upon the Littoral Combat Ship, a smaller and less expensive ship, 
when compared to destroyers and cruisers, that depending on which module it is 
equipped with, could handle the mine, diesel submarine, and small boat threats in the 
littoral environment.  The LCS design does not, however, have an anti-air capability 
outside of limited self-defense.   
 
Figure 3.   The overlapping threat environment in the littoral region (From Naval Warfare 
Development Command,  2007) 
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2. What Is the Littoral Combat Ship? 
a. Overview 
The LCS is planned to fill the need for a combatant in the littoral regions 
of the world and to replace several classes of ships that are being retired, most notably 
frigates and minesweepers.  Flexibility is the defining characteristic of LCS as it is 
expected to operate in a littoral region in the SUW, MIW, and ASW missions.   
The LCS is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant that is to be 
equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages, including 
unmanned vehicles (UVs).  Rather than being a multimission ship like the 
Navy’s larger surface combatants, the LCS is to be a focused-mission ship 
equipped to perform one primary mission at any one time.  The ship’s 
mission orientation can be changed by changing its mission packages.  
The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to 
as the LCS sea frame.  (Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: 
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, April 8, 2010) 
b. Seaframe 
As the core of LCS, the seaframe provides for basic self-defense capability 
through organic sensors, weapons, and speed.  There are two seaframe designs that are 
being considered with one of each already in service.  There are differences between the 
two seaframes but those are not the focus of this thesis.  The two seaframes are capable of 
40+ knots and are similarly equipped regarding organic sensors and weaponry.  The only 
organic capabilities that this thesis looks at are the speed of 40+ knots and the radar 
system.  The radar is the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) 
Three-Dimensional Track Reporting System (TRS-3D), which is a naval multimode 
three-dimensional air/surface search radar with periscope detection capability.   
c. Capabilities 
The focus of this thesis is on the SUW module equipped LCS.  The SUW 
module is designed to detect and engage multiple surface contacts in a littoral 
environment.  It strengthens the core seaframe capability by adding an air-to-surface 
missile armed aircraft and a surface-to-surface missile capability.  According to the Naval 
Sea System Command:  
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These components include electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a 
vertical takeoff unmanned air vehicle to provide over-the-horizon 
detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four non-line-of-sight 
launching system (NLOS-LS) container launch units or “missile-in-a-box” 
systems, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-
60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions(U.S. Navy, 
2007).  
3. Issues 
There are some concerns about the LCS program.  Some concerns stem from the 
rising costs of the ships, some from the slow development of the required technologies 
for the warfare modules, and some from the combat survivability of the seaframes.   
a. Combat Survivability 
There are concerns about the survivability of the LCS in a combat 
situation due to its small crew size, which limits damage control operations, and the 
limited shock hardened design of both seaframes.   
The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment 
as evidenced by the limited shock hardened design and results of full scale 
testing of representative hull structures completed in December 2006 
(O’Rourke 2010, p. 17).  
b. Development of Required Technologies 
Of the 19 critical technologies required for the two different seaframe 
options, only 15 can be said to be fully mature and of the 25 critical technologies required 
for the MIW, SUW, and ASW modules only 17 are currently mature (GAO March 2009).  
Not only has the development been behind what was expected, but the development cost 
of the modules and the seaframes have been much higher than expected.   
4. Suitability  
Some that feel that the LCS is not, in fact, the right ship for the littoral 
environment.  One such person is Milan Vego, who in an article in the Armed Forces 
Journal writes, “The best weapon to counter enemy small surface combatants is a force of 
small surface combatants” (Vego 2008).  He goes on to state that the LCS is not a real 
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littoral combat vessel but is an ocean-going vessel due to its draft of 20 feet.  He feels this 
will limit the maneuverability of the LCS in the confined waters of a littoral environment 
and that no matter how well equipped it might be that it would not be able to defend 
against a large number of hostile small boats.  He is mistaken in his talk of the draft of the 
LCS. The Freedom class has a draft of 13.5 feet and the Independence class has a draft of 
14.8 feet.  Martin Murphy, of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment came 
out in favor of the LCS.  He makes the point that the LCS with its high speed and shallow 
draft of 15 feet is a kind of “light cavalry” for the Navy.  He also points out that the real 
value of the LCS comes from its large flight deck and its ability to operate two MH-60R 
helicopters or an assortment of drones; moreover, a MH-60R is faster and more 
maneuverable than any small boat and when armed with Hellfire Missiles it is a very 
lethal aircraft (Murphy 2010).   
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Figure 4 is an excellent illustration of how the U.S. Navy envisions LCS being 
used.  The Navy refers to this as a distributed force in the littoral, not platform-centric 
(Global Security 2003).  The Navy sees Littoral Combat Ships, each with appropriate 
network of off board sensors and systems, being able to operate independently or 
interdependently as part of a littoral operations force or a multi-mission fleet force.  The 
point is for the LCS to be networked with its autonomous vehicles, whether for SUW, 
MIW, or ASW and to use those vehicles to allow LCS to investigate contacts or shipping 
without exposing the ship or any of its crew to harm.  Looking at it from the SUW point 
of view, these networked UAVs or MH-60R will be able to detect, identify, classify and 
track a threat and with the Non Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) that the LCS is 
equipped with, it will be able to engage surface threats as far out as 40 kilometers.  This 
means that the SUW LCS will have the capability to handle most threats outside of their 
engagement envelope thereby limiting the loss of equipment and life to that of the UAV 
or the MH-60R.  This also means that the UAV or MH-60R can limit their risk by  
remaining just close enough to laser-designate the target for the ship without getting 
within the range of any hand-held Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) that might be onboard 
the threat boat.   
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Figure 4.   How the U.S. Navy envisions LCS utilizing automated vehicles to complete its 
missions.  (From Naval Warfare Development Command,  2007) 
D. ISSUES 
There is a major issue with the current plan for the SUW module equipped LCS 
and that is the development of the NLOS-LS.  Originally an Army program it was 
discovered earlier this year that the NLOS-LS’s Precision Attack Missile (PAM) is not 
very precise, missing four out of six targets in tests conducted in at White Sands Missile 
Range, New Mexico, between January 26, 2010 and February 5, 2010.   
Test missiles failed to hit a moving tank 20 kilometers away, a moving 
infantry vehicle 10 kilometers away, a stationary tank 30 kilometers away, 
and a stationary truck 35 kilometers away.  It missed the infantry vehicle 
by 20 meters, and the truck by 25 kilometers.  (Brannen February 22, 
2010) 
It is note-worthy that the two hits came when the missile used its laser designator 
instead of its infrared seeker, so there is still potential.  The results of the test were 




funding for continued research and development switched to the Navy (Brannen May 12, 
2010).  Another cause for concern is the price tag; each PAM costs an astounding 
$466,000.   
1. Options 
These issues with the NLOS-LS program have some in the Navy wondering if the 
NLOS-LS program is the right fit for the LCS SUW module.  Other options are available 
to provide the LCS with an over-the-horizon anti-surface capability. 
a. Current 
The RGM-84 Harpoon missile is the current U.S. Navy surface-to-surface 
anti-ship missile.  It is an existing technology and is still in production.  The main 
downside is that where the talk for NLOS was for putting 45 or 60 PAMs on the LCS, 
with Harpoons it would probably be limited to eight missiles.   
b. Future 
The Navy is looking ahead for a next-generation ship-launched surface-to-
surface missile (Peterson 2010), but as of April 2010, the Navy was still drafting an 
initial capabilities document, which means that any next-generation program is still quite 
a few years down the road.  Some of the programs that have potential are the Naval Strike 
Missile (NSM) of the Royal Norwegian Navy, the Multi-Mission Tomahawk (MMT), or 
a more advanced Harpoon missile (Peterson 2010).   
E. AIRBORNE PLATFORMS 
This section provides a brief overview and capabilities description of the aircraft 
used in the scenarios for this thesis.   
1. MH-60R 
a. Overview 
The MH-60R is one of the latest versions of the Sikorsky S-70B helicopter 
that has been in use in the U.S. Navy for years.  Much like the LCS, the MH-60R is a 
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multi-mission platform.  It is equipped to conduct both ASW and SUW as its primary 
missions and is able to employ Link 16 to further incorporate it into a strike group’s 
network.  The avionics have been designed to be non-mission specific so that the pilot 
can shift from a search and rescue (SAR) mission to a SUW mission to an ASW mission 
and be looking at the same cockpit.   
b. Capabilities 
The MH-60R combines the capabilities of the SH-60B with the dipping 
sonar of the SH-60F.  Most of these capabilities are for ASW and are of no interest to this 
thesis.  The capabilities that are relevant to this thesis are that the MH-60R is outfitted to 
carry and use eight Hellfire missiles and is equipped with the Telephonics AN/APS-147 
search radar and the Raytheon AN/AAS-44 FLIR/laser ranger.  The AN/APS-147 has the 
ability to auto detect and track up to 255 contacts simultaneously.   
2. Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout  
a. Overview 
Based on a modified Schweizer 333 light helicopter, the MQ-8B has a 
four-blade rotor, a streamlined fuselage pod in place of the cabin, and increased fuel 
capacity.   Due to delays in the LCS program, a ship of the FFG-7 class, the USS 
McInerney, was selected to conduct a technical evaluation of the Fire Scout.  Between 
December 2008 and November 2009 110 ship take-offs and landings were conducted.  
During this time period the Fire Scout completed a successful deployment in the US 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) (Jane’s April 21, 
2010).  
b.  Capabilities 
The Fire Scout is capable of 125 knots in level flight and has a mission 
radius of 110 nautical miles (NM).  With a maximum payload of 272 kg (600 lb) it has an 
endurance of three hours.  It is also equipped with FLIR, a laser designator, and the 
General Atomics AN/APY-8 Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/Moving Target 
Indication (MTI) radar.   
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F. MISSILES 
This section provides a brief introduction to the different missile systems and 
missiles relevant to this thesis.     
1. Non Line of Sight-Launch System (NLOS-LS) 
The NLOS began as an Army project being developed by Lockheed Martin.  
Since then it has become a Joint Army-Navy project and is now just a Navy project.  The 
plan was to integrate the NLOS-LS into the LCS but the future of the program is 
currently in question due to some subpar test results in which the missile missed four out 
of six targets (Defense Tech, 2010).  The design concept is for the target to be detected, 
identified, classified, and tracked by an off-board surveillance platform and then for the 
LCS to set aim points for the Precision Attack Missile (PAM). LCS will send continuous 
target updates to the missile until it is about eight km from the target at which time each 
PAM begins to zero-in on its specified target using its MTI and its automatic target 
acquisition capabilities.  The missiles are contained in Container Launching Units 
(CLUs); each CLU is a self-contained 16 cell launching system that has 15 missiles and a 
Computer and Communications System (CCS).  The plan is for four CLUs to be carried 
in each LCS SUW module.   
 
 
Figure 5.   NLOS launching from CLU (From Defense Tech, 2010)  
The PAM is subsonic and has a range of 40 km.  The PAM has three seeker 
options available: it can use its IR seeker to search for and lock onto its target, it can use 
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its laser-guided seeker to search for reflected laser energy from a third party designator, 
or it can use GPS to fly to a specified GPS location and detonate on impact.  The PAMs 
can be fired at five-second intervals and each is equipped with a 13.2 kg multi-mission 
warhead.  Current estimates put the cost of each NLOS missile at $466,000 apiece 
(Defense Tech, 2010).   
2. RGM-84 Harpoon  
The Harpoon is the most widely used, western made, ship-launched, anti-ship 
missile.  It has been in use in the U.S. Navy since 1977.  Although it has not seen much 
use of late in the U.S. Navy, having not been included on the flight II DDGs; the U.S. 
continues to fund research into upgrades and is continuing to upgrade its current stock of 
Harpoon Missiles.   
The latest version of Harpoon is sea-skimming capable with an active radar seeker 
and datalink, meaning it can be updated while in flight.  It carries a 222 kg warhead and 
has proven flight reliability, which has increased over the years, has can be seen in the 
Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Harpoon Flight Reliability (From Jane’s, Feb 04, 2010)  
Fiscal Year Missiles launched Successes Success percentage 
1975-76 98 87 88.77 
1977-78 73 68 93.15 
1979-81 114 106 92.98 
1982-89 136 134 98.5 
Total 421 395 93.35 
 
3. AGM-114 Hellfire 
The Hellfire (an acronym for Heliborne, Laser, Fire and Forget) Modular Missile 
System was designed as an anti-armor and precision attack weapon in the 1970s with the 
requirement that it could attack both stationary and moving targets.  The Hellfire has 
been cleared for use with several helicopter and UAV platforms in the U.S. inventory, 
including the MH-60R, the MQ-1 Predator UAV, and AH-64 Apache.  The Air Force is 
even looking at integrating it with the next generation of AC-130 gunships.   
The missiles can be carried on two or four-rail launcher assemblies.  The variant 
this thesis is looking at is the AGM-114M, which has a 12.5 kg warhead, a maximum 
range of nine kilometers, and uses semi-active laser guidance.   
4. Low-Cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) 
There have been several efforts by the U.S. Navy to design and build an 
affordable precision guidance system for the standard Hydra 70 rocket.  The LOGIR is 
unlike most other guided rocket programs, in that it relies on infrared guidance rather 
than semi-active laser homing technique.  As of 2007, LOGIR was being co-operatively 
developed by the United States and South Korea.   
The LOGIR modification is designed to turn an existing Hydra 70 rocket or 
CRV7 rocket into a guided rocket with the addition of a new guidance and control system 
(GCS).  This system incorporates an imaging infrared seeker for terminal homing and an 
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inertial navigation platform.  This seeker uses an uncooled staring focal plane array 
(FPA) that uses imaging matching to locate and identify its target.  The target is then 
designated using the FLIR sensor on the launching helicopter or UAV and the LOGIR 
then uses that data to track and acquire the target itself.  LOGIR is intended to be used as 
a fire-and-forget weapon, allowing for a greater rate of fire than a semi-active laser 
homing guided rocket.  The effective range is expected to be about five kilometers and 
since it is using existing Hydra 70 rockets, the warhead should be the standard 7.7 kg 
(Jane’s).  Since this program will be using the existing Hydra 70 rockets, there is a 
possibility that the Office of Naval Research (ONR) will attempt to utilize the existing 
Hydra 70 rocket launchers.   
5. Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) 
The APKWS program is another initiative by the United States military to 
develop the standard Hydra 70 rocket and the CRV7 rocket into low-cost precision-
guided weapons.  This program was initiated by the U.S. Army and was taken over by the 
Navy in 2008 with the intention to equip Marine Corps combat helicopters. APKWS has 
a range from between 0.91 miles to 3.1 miles and also has the standard 7.7 kg warhead 
found in the Hydra 70 rocket.  The big difference between APKWS and LOGIR is that 
APKWS uses semi-active laser guidance.  There is a big difference between APKWS and 
other laser guided rockets in that it uses four distributed aperture semi-active laser 
seekers (DASALs), similar to those found in the Army’s precision guided mortar 
munitions program.  With these four seekers, the APKWS has demonstrated an accuracy 
of 0.5 meters in tests (Jane’s 2010).  Eight operational assessment test firings were 
conducted by the U.S. Marines in January 2010 and in April 2010, low rate initial 
production was approved.  As with the LOGIR, there is a good chance that ONR will 
attempt to utilize the existing Hydra 70 rocket launchers, which come in seven packs and 
19 packs of rockets.  The APKWS is very similar to the LOGIR in capability but appears 
to be slightly more accurate but with a slower rate of fire due to its required lasing of the 
target.   
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6. Directional Attack Guided Rocket (DAGR) 
The DAGR is another attempt to convert the conventional Hydra 70 and the 
standard CRV7 rockets into precision-guidance weapons.  Like the APKWS, the DAGR 
uses a semi-active laser (SAL) seeker.  The DAGR is so similar to the Hellfire that it is 
often called the Hellfire II.  A feature about the DAGR that stands out is that Lockheed 
Martin has designed a smart launcher for the DAGR that can be clipped into place on a 
M299 or M310 Hellfire launcher.  This launcher allows for a four-pack of DAGRs to be 
placed in each Hellfire slot.  Lockheed Martin is also working on a six-pack DAGR 
launcher design.  The DAGR is highly capable precision rocket, having both Lock On 
Before Launch (LOBL) or Lock On After Launch (LOAL) modes.  If launched from an 
altitude of 20,000 feet, it is designed to be accurate to within one meter at a 12,000 meter 
range.  If launched from near-ground level it is accurate to within one meter at 7,000 
meters.  The DAGR is currently being looked at by all branches of the U.S. armed forces.   
 
Figure 6.   A four-round DAGR pod plus a Hellfire missile on a M310 launcher  
(From Jane’s 2010) 
G. RELATED STUDIES 
Several theses have been conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School concerning 
LCS and/or allied ships conducting operations against large numbers of small boats.  
Andre Tiwari’s thesis (2008) showed that a gap in capability exists in the surface force to 
defend itself against small threat craft.  Benjamin Abbot’s thesis (2008) explored the best 
mix of LCS mission packages and determined that LCS should operate in squadrons of 
between six to ten ships for the best results, with five LCS equipped for the primary 
threat and two LCS for the secondary threat.  Another thesis dealing with LCS was done 
by Michael Milliken in September 2008 in which he conducted an impact analysis of a 
mixed squadron, containing LCS and multi-mission surface platforms, on blue force 
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casualties and mission effectiveness.  Milliken’s conclusion was that a squadron with five 
to eleven LCSs with one to two DDGs is the most effective in an SUW scenario.  Omur 
Ozdemir’s thesis (2009) did a comparison of the Freedom class LCS and other 
frigates/corvettes against small boat, fast patrol boat, and submarine threats in confined 
waters.  His conclusion was that the LCS was the most combat effective, but that its high 
cost meant that it was not the best candidate.    
H. SUMMARY 
The LCS is the Navy’s answer to the challenge of projecting power “from the 
sea” in the littoral environment and in supporting ground forces ashore.  The concept of 
operations calls for the LCS to operate distributed sensor platforms, both manned and 
unmanned to find and engage threats, keeping the LCS out of direct combat and utilizing 
missiles from the LCS matched with the sensor platforms to provide over-the-horizon 
capability.   
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to accurately capture how these different missiles will work in a wartime 
environment, a robust scenario that contains a realistic and capable threat is required.  In 
this chapter, a brief description of the MANA simulation tool is provided as is a 
description of the behavior of the simulation model.   
B. THE MANA COMBAT SIMULATION TOOL 
1.  Choosing MANA 
MANA is combat model developed and provided to NPS by New Zealand’s 
Defense Technology Agency (DTA).  “MANA is an agent-based distillation model 
developed by DTA for use in military operations analysis studies” (McIntosh 2009).  One 
of the best qualities of MANA and one of the main reasons it was used in this thesis is 
that it is event driven, and as a result, it gives a remarkable depiction of simulated 
combat.  In using MANA, one can more accurately depict the attributes of the individual 
agents and MANA gives one the ability to vary these attributes which allows the 
simulator to have the ability to observe and quantify the effects of these varying attributes 
on the battlefield outcomes.  Another point in MANA’s favor is how easy it is to use.  It 
has a very simple interface that allows the simulator to vary all of the attributes of the 
agents involved.  “The simple nature of the model allows both rapid parameter space 
exploration and experimentation with co-evolving tactics, yet it has enough sophistication 
to produce realistic looking behaviors and tactics (Lauren 2002).”   
2. MANA Characteristics 
In this thesis, version 5.00.89 of MANA is being used.  Released in June 2010, 
this is the latest version of MANA.  One of the biggest advantages of MANA version 5 
over older versions is that battlefield distances, agent speeds, and weapons characteristics 
can be defined in real world units (for example, meters, km/hr, nautical miles).  This is 
possible because the cell-based movement scheme of previous MANA versions has been 
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replaced by a vector-based scheme.  Not only does this allow for real world units to be 
used, but it also allows for much larger battlefields to be utilized as well.  One of the 
other advantages of MANA in general, is that it leaves out detailed physical attributes of 
the entities being analyzed, such as the effects of the sea state upon the ships involved, 
allowing for the model to run relatively fast on a PC or laptop.  This also means that a 
large number of runs of the scenario with varying attributes can be explored in a 
reasonable amount of time.  In MANA the user develops squads, one for each type of 
platform being used in the simulation.  Each squad is assigned weapons and sensors and 
personalities based on the user’s needs.  These personalities give the squads simple rules 
about how they are to move based upon the location of other squads and conditions on 
the battlefield.  The user sets this up by weighing different aspects of the squad in the 
Personalities tab of the squad properties, shown below in Figure 7.  In this example the 
squad would be focused only on going to the next waypoint, but would fire upon enemies 
if they are within range and its weapons are activated, but would not pursue any action 
other than following its pre-designed path.   
 
 
Figure 7.   The personality screen used in MANA version 5.   
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Figure 8.   Screen shot of MANA start up screen.  
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
The focus of this section is to provide the characteristics of the MANA model that 
was created for this research.  The goal of the simulation is discussed as is the scale, the 
friendly forces, the enemy forces, and issues regarding sources of data, abstractions, and 
assumptions.  A more detailed breakdown of the personalities and capabilities of the 
friendly and enemy forces can be found in Appendix A. 
1. Goal of the Simulation 
The scenario used in this thesis is designed to stress the capabilities and potential 
capabilities of each missile type in order to gain insight into which missiles would be best 
for use with the SUW module equipped LCS.  The factors that play an important role in 
this simulation are all concerned with the missile capabilities.  These factors are the 
maximum range, the rate of fire, the probability of hit, and the number of missiles being 
carried.  Using design of experiment techniques, these capabilities are explored over large  
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ranges to determine which were the most important and to what extent and which missile, 
based on its potential capabilities, is the best for use.  Chapter IV describes the 
experimental design in detail.   
2. Scale and Terrain 
MANA is a time step model. For this study, the model was set so that each time 
step was equal to 10 seconds of real world time.  Each run of the simulation lasts no 
longer than 500 time steps; which is equivalent to about an hour and 23 minutes in real 
world time.  The simulation map is 40 kilometers by 40 kilometers.  MANA does provide 
for one to be able to model different types of terrain.  Since the effect of the sea state on 
the ships was not one of the aspects being measured, no terrain was used in this 
simulation as it would be introduce unnecessary detail.   
3. Friendly Forces 
The friendly forces are assigned a home position as well as waypoints.  The LCS 
transits from its home position due north and engages enemies when it is capable.  The 
helicopter/UAV is 25 kilometers northeast by east of the LCS and is transiting towards 
the suspected location of enemy guided missile patrol boats.  The helicopter/UAV transits 
according to its speed and will pursue and engage enemies detected.   
4. Enemy Forces 
Just like the friendly forces, the enemy forces are also assigned a home position.  
Their home position is a box in which they can start at any point in that box, which 
MANA decides randomly.  They know there is an American LCS to the west and are 
headed to get good contact on it and attack.  The enemy threat consists of 20 missile 
boats.  They transit and attack as a group for safety and cumulative strength.  Once the 
LCS is detected the missile boats will pursue.   
 23
5. Sources, Abstractions, and Assumptions 
As with every simulation, the source of input data and assumptions are important.  
In this scenario, communications and logistics are assumed to work perfectly, and fuel is 
unlimited.  Maintenance and equipment failure are not considered.   
Enemy force sensor and weapon information, number of weapons per enemy 
agent, and the capabilities of some of the friendly sensors and weapons were taken from 
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2010.  The probabilities associated with the sensors and weapons 
were generalized and reviewed by Jeff Kline, retired Navy Captain and Chair of Warfare 
Innovation at NPS, and LCDR Stacey Prescott, a SH-60B pilot with Hellfire experience.  
These probabilities are explored through design of experiment techniques that are 
discussed in the next chapter.   
It is a rare occurrence in which a simulation tool perfectly fits the problem being 
modeled.  Oftentimes, issues are discovered during the model development process that 
are either fixed by the developers or addressed via other modeling work-arounds.  In this 
thesis, one such modeling issue was discovered.  The issue had to do with MANA’s 
ability to simulate one squad’s ability to spoof a missile using electronic warfare or chaff, 
or to be able to shoot it down.  Since the enemy missile boats that were simulated are not 
equipped with an anti-missile defense system, it was not necessary to worry about this 
issue with them.  With the focus solely on the LCS it was easy to ignore the problem by 
making the goal of the friendly forces to be to ensure that none of the missile boats even 
got to where they could fire their missiles at the LCS.   
D. SUMMARY 
MANA was used for this thesis to simulate a scenario in which a SUW module 
equipped LCS and its accompanying aircraft are faced with 20 inbound missile boats.  
The scenario is designed to test the potential capabilities of different surface-to-surface 
and air-to-surface missiles that the SUW module may be equipped with and to determine 
which capabilities are the most important.   
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IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the assumptions used for the setup of the simulation as well as 
a description of how the simulation was designed.  Special attention is paid to the 
parameters used to direct the abilities and actions of the squads.   
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
There are two types of variables that are used in simulation: controllable and 
uncontrollable.  Controllable variables are those that can be altered by the decision maker 
and uncontrollable variables are the ones that a decision maker cannot control.  
Controllable variables are often known as decision factors, whereas uncontrollable 
variables are often referred to as noise factors.  This thesis focuses on the decision factors 
in order to provide greater insight into which weapons systems provide the best option in 
Surface Warfare.  Since the enemy sensor and weapon ranges, their probabilities of 
detection and kill, and the number of enemy patrol craft are fixed, there are no noise 
factors in this thesis.  Table 2 defines the variables used in this study.   
Table 2.   Variable factors used in the experiment design.   
Factor Value Range Explanation 
LCS Probability of 
Detecti
on (PD) 
0.5…1 Probability of Detection associated with 
the LCS seaframe 
MH-60R PD 0.5…1 Probability of Detection associated with 
the MH-60 sensor 
UAV PD 0.4…1 Probability of Detection associated with 
the UAV sensor 
NLOS Probability of 
Kill 
(PK) 
0.13…0.585 Probability of kill associated with the 
NLOS Missile System 
NLOS Inter-firing rate 
(Ifr) 
5…25 Time between subsequent firings of the 
NLOS Missile System 
Harpoon PK 0.8075…0.9405 Probability of kill associated with the 
Harpoon missile system 
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Factor Value Range Explanation 
Harpoon Ifr 10…25 Time between subsequent firings of the 
Harpoon Missile System 
Hellfire Pk 0.6375…0.7125 Probability of kill associated with the 
Hellfire missile 





8   MH60 
2…6  UAV 






5000…8000 Maximum effective range of the Hellfire 
missle in a given run 
LOGIR Pk 0.4225…0.585 Probability of kill associated with the 
LOGIR 
LOGIR Ifr 6…16 Time between subsequent firings of the 
LOGIR  
LOGIR Qc 14…38 MH-60 
7…19  UAV 
Number of LOGIR carried in a given run 
LOGIR MER 4000…5800 Maximum effective range of LOGIR in a 
given run 
APKWS Pk 0.4875…0.6175 Probability of kill associated with the 
APKWS 
APKWS Ifr 8…20 Time between subsequent firings of the 
APKWS 
APKWS Qc 14…38  MH-60 
7…19 UAV 
Number of APKWS carried in a given 
run 
APKWS MER 4000…5000 Maximum effective range of APKWS in 
a given run 
DAGR Pk 0.4875…0.6175 Probability of kill associated with the 
DAGR 
DAGR Ifr 8…20 Time between subsequent firings of the 
DAGR 
DAGR Qc 8…12  MH60 
2…8  UAV 
Number of DAGR carried in a given run 
DAGR MER 4500…7000 Maximum effective range of DAGR in a 
given run 
 
1. Controllable Factors 
The following variables are chosen in order to explore the effectiveness of 
different surface-to-surface and air-to-surface weapon systems.   
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a. LCS Probability of Detection (Pd) 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the LCS.  
The sensor being modeled is the 3D surface search radar that will be used by LCS.   
b. MH-60R Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the MH-
60R.  The sensor being modeled is the AN/APS-147 surface search radar. 
c. UAV Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the MQ-8 
Fire Scout.  The sensor being modeled is the Tactical Synthetic Aperture Radar (TSAR).   
d. NLOS Probability of Kill (Pk) 
The probability of kill associated with the NLOS missile system when 
employed in the SUW mission package.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit 
and the probability of kill given a hit.   
e. NLOS Inter Firing Rate (Ifr) 
The inter-firing rate associated with the NLOS system.  This is the amount 
of time between subsequent firings of the NLOS.   
f. Harpoon Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Harpoon missile system when 
employed in the SUW mission package.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit 
and the probability of kill given a hit.   
g. Harpoon Ifr 
The inter-firing rate associated with the Harpoon missile.  This is the 
amount of time between subsequent firings of the Harpoon missile.   
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h. Hellfire Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Hellfire missile when employed 
by the MH-60R or the Fire Scout UAV.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit 
and the probability of kill given a hit.   
i. Hellfire Ifr 
The inter-firing rate associated with the Hellfire missile.  This is the 
amount of time between subsequent firings of the Hellfire missile.   
j. Hellfire Quantity Carried (Qc) 
The number of Hellfire missiles being carried by the MH-60R or the Fire 
Scout UAV.  This is based off of it being known that the MH-60R is capable of carrying 
eight Hellfire Missiles (Jane’s) and that the Fire Scout is capable of carrying two based 
on its weight limitations.   
k. Hellfire Maximum Effective Range (MER) 
The maximum effective range of the Hellfire missile when employed by 
the MH-60R or the Fire Scout UAV.   
l. LOGIR Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the LOGIR when employed by the 
MH-60R or the Fire Scout UAV.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit and the 
probability of kill given a hit.   
m. LOGIR Ifr 
The inter-firing rate associated with the LOGIR.  This is the amount of 
time between subsequent firings of the LOGIR.   
n. LOGIR Qc 
The number of LOGIR being carried by the MH-60R or Fire Scout UAV.   
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o. LOGIR MER 
The maximum effective range of the LOGIR when employed by the MH-
60R or the Fire Scout UAV.   
p. APKWS Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the APKWS when equipped by the 
MH-60R or the Fire Scout UAV.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit and the 
probability of kill given a hit.   
q. APKWS Ifr 
The-inter firing rate associated with the APKWS.  This is the amount of 
time between subsequent firings of the APKWS.   
r. APKWS Qc 
The number of APKWS being carried by the MH-60R or Fire Scout UAV.   
s. APKWS MER 
The maximum effective range of the APKWS when employed by the MH-
60R or the Fire Scout UAV.   
t. DAGR Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the DAGR when employed by the 
MH-60R or the Fire Scout UAV.  The Pk is the product of the probability of hit and the 
probability of kill given a hit.   
u. DAGR Ifr 
The inter-firing rate associated with the DAGR.  This is the amount of 
time between subsequent firings of the DAGR.   
v. DAGR Qc 
The number of DAGR being carried by the MH-60R or Fire Scout UAV.   
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w. DAGR MER 
The maximum effective range of the DAGR when employed by the MH-
60R or the Fire Scout UAV.   
2. Assumptions 
• The DAGR, APKWS, and LOGIR will be based on the Hydra 70 rocket 
with its 7.7 kg warhead and not the CRV7 rocket with 4.5 kg warhead.  
• The Fire Scout UAV can carry two Hellfire Missiles 
• The Fire Scout UAV can laser designate targets for the LCS 
• LOGIR and DAGR have the same minimum rage as APKWS, which is 
reported as 0.93 miles in Jane’s 
• The LCS can fire its missiles off of MH-60R or Fire Scout sensor data 
• The MH-60R detect range of a 50 foot missile patrol boat is 30,000 meters 
and the classify range is 8,500 meters 
• The Fire Scout detect range of a 50 foot missile patrol boat is 28,000 
meters and the classify range is 8,000 meters 
C. THE EXPERIMENT 
1. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
The NOLH experimental design technique was developed at NPS by Lt. Col. 
Thomas Cioppa, United States Army, in 2002.  This technique was designed to efficiently 
explore simulations that have a large input space, requiring minimum a priori 
assumptions (Cioppa, 2002).  The space filling property of the NOLH allows the analyst 
to explore more of the input space than the traditional factorial design, in which only high 
and low values are considered.  The NOLH does not allow the analyst to see all of the 




surface.  A NOLH generation tool created by Professor Susan Sanchez at NPS was used 
to generate the designs for this thesis.  Detailed tables of the experimental designs used 
are provided in Appendix B.   
2. Exploratory Design 
To explore MANA’s suitability to address the question posed by this thesis, an 
exploratory design of the scenario was created.  This scenario is very abstract, includes a 
smaller number of threat vessels, and is intended to provide insight into the modeling of 
the different personalities, sensor capabilities, and communications capabilities for each 
squad in the scenario.  This scenario verifies that the aircraft are not able to be shot down 
by the surface-to-surface missiles on the red forces, that the LCS can use the aircraft’s 
sensor data, and that the sensors and weapons are working properly.  Sensor verification 
was, in part, accomplished by having MANA track the detection of each squad by the 
other squads and using this data to tweak the personalities of the squads.   
3. Preliminary Design 
With the exploratory design working bug free, it was time to expand upon it.  The 
aircraft was copied and made into two squads with the adjustments made to differentiate 
between the Fire Scout UAV and the MH-60R.  The simulation was then run several 
times with the aircraft variously turned on or off to ensure that the switch was working 
smoothly.  Turning the aircraft on and off was done by marking the corresponding 
aircraft squad as either active or inactive in that particular scenario.  The same procedure 
was done with the aircrafts’ weapons.  Then, the number of enemy missile patrol boats 
was slowly worked up in increments of two until reaching the maximum of 20.   
4. Final Design 
After several dozen runs of the preliminary design, during which the design was 
validated with the assistance of Mary McDonald of the SEED center, the final design was 
implemented.  The 512 runs created by the NOLH were used with each run being 
replicated 40 times for both versions of the scenario, one with the Fire Scout UAV active 
and one with the MH-60R active.  These 40 replications of each run resulted in there 
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being 20,480 runs for each scenario, which resulted in 532,480 data points for each 
scenario and 1,064,960 total data points.  The analysis of these data points is the basis for 
this thesis and is covered in the next chapter.   
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
The base case MANA scenario, in Extensible Markup Language (XML) format, 
and the DOE file, in comma-separated value (CSV) format, were entered into a software 
program called XStudy, written by SEED Center Research Associate Steve Upton. The 
XStudy program enables the user to map each column in the design file to a specific 
parameter in MANA using XPath expressions. Other details about the study design, such 
as the version of MANA and number of replications per design point, are also entered 
into this tool, yielding a single Study.xml file. This file is used by another program called 
oldmcdata, also written by Steve Upton, which automatically updates the MANA XML 
file, producing a separate XML scenario file for each of the different factor combinations. 
This program then launches MANA runs on the SEED Center's high-performance 
computing cluster for each of the separate files. This is done to automate the parallel 
implementation of the MANA simulated runs and subsequently collect the output data 
into a single CSV file. 
E. SUMMARY 
The NOLH design provided by Professor Susan Sanchez of NPS was used to vary 
the 23 variables across the full range of values into a total of 1,028 rows of data.  These 
rows of data, in two sets of 512 each, were each executed 40 times to provide 1,064,960 
total data points. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
The experiment described in the Chapter IV generated a large amount of data.  
This chapter begins by discussing how the data was collected and processed for analysis.  
The purpose of this analysis is to provide insight into the research questions, which are 
restated in this chapter.   
A. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
The output provided by MANA is in the form of a CSV file that allows for simple 
processing, as it is a file that can be read by a multitude of statistical software programs 
without the need to adjust the data.  These output files provide the number of casualties to 
each squad, as well as the input variables that are used with each run.  For each scenario 
there were 512 different sets of input data that were run 40 times each, resulting in 20,480 
rows of data for each scenario, or 40,960 rows of data total.  In order to compile the 
output data into a more manageable number, summaries of the output files were needed.  
Each of the scenario output files was imported into a statistical software packaged called 
JMP version 8.0, a program created by SAS Institute Incorporated.  The means and 
standard deviations were generated for each input combination, bringing the rows of data 
from 20,480 down to 512 for the summaries of the two scenarios.  The measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) used in this research is the mean total Red casualties.   
B. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In Chapter I, three questions were offered as the basis of this research.  Each of 
these questions has been addressed through data analysis.  The research questions for this 
thesis are: 
• What surface-to-surface missile should LCS deploy with? 
• What type of air-to-surface missiles should the aircraft be equipped with 
to be the most effective? 
• What factors are more important in determining the type of missile to 
select? 
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This analysis includes the use of several analytical tools, including partition trees 
and bivariate analysis.   
1. Surface-to-Surface Missile for the SUW Module 
The question regarding the LCS surface-to-surface missile is the same in both 
versions of the scenario and so data from both output summaries will be viewed. 
a. MH-60R Scenario 
As shown in Table 3, the first split is determined by whether or not the 
ship is equipped with NLOS or Harpoon.  With NLOS the mean number of Red 
casualties is 10.70 while the mean with Harpoon is only 4.98.  This result can be 
interpreted to mean that the NLOS missile system is superior, but if one splits the data 
further, one can see that, when the rate of fire of the NLOS is less than 11 (or greater than 
9.1 seconds between shots), that the mean number of Red casualties drops to 4.12 making 
it less capable than Harpoon.  As one can see from Table 3, the Pk of the NLOS is less 
important as long as the rate of fire is 11 or better (9.1 seconds or less between shots).  If 
the NLOS rate is below 11, then the Harpoon appears to be a better choice based on the 
split as long as the Harpoon rate of fire is greater or equal to 6 (16.7 seconds between 
shots of less).    
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Table 3.   The partition tree comparing the Harpoon and NLOS data from the MH-
60R summary data, based upon the mean number of Red casualties.   
 
b. UAV Scenario 
As shown in Table 4, the data from the UAV runs shows nearly identical 
results as the MH-60R data.  The NLOS is superior to the Harpoon as long as the rate is 
greater than or equal to 11 (9.1 seconds or less between shots), with there being a vast 
difference between the means (10.21 vs 4.02).  If the NLOS rate is greater than 11, then it 
does not appear to matter much what the Pk is.  As before, the Harpoon at a rate greater 
than or equal to 6 (16.7 seconds between shots of less) is superior to the NLOS with a 
rate less than 11 (greater than 9.1 seconds between shots), but only if the NLOS Pk is 
below 0.533.  
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Table 4.   The partition tree comparing the Harpoon and NLOS data from the UAV 
summary data, based upon the mean number of Red casualties.   
 
c. Overall 
The partition trees for both summaries look very similar and both agree 
that the NLOS is superior to the Harpoon as long as the rate of fire is 9.1 seconds 
between shots or less.  If the NLOS rate of fire is less than 9.1 seconds, then a Harpoon 
with a rate of 16.7 seconds or less between shots is slightly superior.   
2. What Type of Air-to-Surface Missile Is Most Effective 
The question regarding which air-to-surface missile would be best to equip the 
aircraft with is the same in both versions of the scenario and so data from both output 
summaries will be viewed.   
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a. MH-60R Scenario 
Table 5 shows that the LOGIR is the most effective missile system.  The 
LOGIR had a mean of 9.30, DAGR had a mean of 7.56, APKWS had a mean of 6.92, and 
Hellfire had a mean of 6.45.  Unfortunately, this interpretation does not provide a 
complete picture since the Standard Deviations are approximately six in each category.   
 
Table 5.   The partition tree of the MH-60R summary data in which the number of 






As is evidenced by Table 6, the first split still takes place with the aircraft 
being equipped with LOGIR having a mean of 9.30 compared to a mean of 6.95 for all 
other missile types.  But, if the rate of fire of the LOGIR is less than 11 (or greater than 
9.1 seconds between shots), then it is no longer the best option.  The next missile that 
meets the criterion for a split is the DAGR.  If the DAGR is equipped and its rate is 
greater than 11 (9.1 seconds or less between shots) then it is the third best option, with a 
mean of 12.418, compared to the LOGIR with a rate greater than 11 having a mean of 
13.366.  The APKWS comes out ahead after the breakdown when it has a rate greater 
than 11, beating out LOGIR with a mean of 14.043.  Of the two, however, LOGIR is 
more likely to have a higher rate of fire, being a fire-and-forget type of missile.  The next 
section will feature a more in-depth look at what features affect the missiles the most.   
 
Table 6.   From the MH-60R Summary data.  A partition tree of the four air-to-




b. UAV Scenario 
The results from the UAV summary are quite similar to those from the 
MH-60R summary.  Looking at Table 7, which shows the overall split between each 
missile, LOGIR is once again leading the way with a mean of 8.07, followed by DAGR, 
then APKWS, then Hellfire.  Looking to Table 8 for a more in-depth breakdown, one can 
see that LOGIR splits off first again, but while LOGIR with a rate of 11 or greater 
appears to lead the way, further splits show that APKWS with a rate of fire of 11 or 
greater has a slightly higher mean; 11.97 versus 11.24.  However, as stated in the 
previous section, it is more likely that the LOGIR will have a greater rate of fire, with it 
being a fire-and-forget type of missile.   
 
Table 7.   A basic partition tree of the UAV summary data showing the breakdown 




Table 8.   From the UAV Summary data.  A partition tree of the four air-to-surface 





The summary data for both versions of the scenario seem to agree that the 
APWKS is the air-to-surface missile of choice.  This holds true only as long as the rate of 
fire of the APKWS is 9.1 seconds or faster.  If the rate is slower than 9.1 seconds, then 
the LOGIR with a rate of 9.1 seconds or faster is the best missile option.  Since the 
LOGIR is a fire-and-forget type of missile, it is more likely to have this higher rate of 
fire.   
3. Most Important Factors in Missile Selection 
The question regarding which factors most impact the MOE of a selected missile 
is the same in both versions of the scenario and so data from both output summaries will 
be viewed.  
a. MH-60R Scenario 
When analyzing mean total Red casualties as broken down per missile 
type, effects screening identifies the rate of fire of each missile as the only statistically 
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significant, or close to statistically significant, factor.  This result is shown in Table 9.  
The only exception to this result is the NLOS system, in which effects screening 
identifies both the rate of fire and the Pk as being statistically significant (p < .05).  The 
reason behind this potentially lies in the fact that the NLOS Pk was varied over a much 
broader range than the other missiles’ Pks.  Of note is that when the NLOS data is put 
into a partition tree, it splits first based on rate of fire, which implies that rate of fire is 
more significant than the Pk.  This is also evident in the overall MH-60R summary 
partition tree in which the rate of fire of the NLOS is the second split in the data, coming 
only after the split between whether the LCS is equipped with NLOS or Harpoon.  This 
was seen previously in Table 3.    
Table 9.   The parameter estimates of the regression analysis resulting from effects 
screening of mean total Red casualties in the MH-60R scenario separated by 










b. UAV Scenario 
When analyzing mean Red casualties as broken down per missile type, 
effects screening identifies the rate of fire of the missile as the most common statistically 
significant factor.  These effects screenings can be seen in Table 10.  In the LOGIR, 
APKWS, DAGR, and Harpoon analyses, the rate of fire is the only statistically 
significant factor.  The NLOS data shows both the rate of fire and the Pk as both being 
statistically significant, but once again, this is most likely due to the large range of the Pk 
that was used for the NLOS.  Similar to the MH-60 data, when the NLOS data is put into 
a partition tree, the first split is on the rate of fire, identifying it as more significant than 
the Pk.  The only oddity is the Hellfire missile, in which effects screening identifies no 
statistically significant factors.   
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Table 10.   The parameter estimates of the regression analysis resulting from effects 
screening of mean total Red casualties in the UAV scenario separated by missile 










Analysis of both sets of data shows that the rate of fire is statistically 
significant for the LOGIR, APKWS, DAGR, NLOS, and Harpoon missile systems.  This 
supports the conclusion that the rate of fire is the most important factor in missile 
selection.   
C. SUMMARY 
Analysis of the data points shows that the NLOS is the preferred surface-to-
surface missile as long as it is able to maintain a rate of fire of 9.1 seconds or faster.  The 
analysis of the data on the air-to-surface missiles shows that the LOGIR is superior 
overall, but that the APKWS is slightly better if its rate of fire is 9.1 seconds or faster.  
When analyzing how the different factors contribute to the effectiveness of the missiles, it 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Which Surface-to-Surface Missile Should LCS Deploy With? 
Based on the data analysis the NLOS-LS is superior to the Harpoon as long as a 
firing rate of 9.1 seconds or faster is maintainable.  The data also shows that the Pk of the 
NLOS does not matter for the most part as long as the high firing rate is maintained.   
2. What Type of Air-to-Surface Missile Should the Aircraft Be Equipped 
With? 
Based on the analysis of the summary data, the LOGIR is best Air-to-Surface 
missile option overall, especially if a rate of fire of 9.1 seconds or faster can be 
maintained.  Further analysis shows that the APKWS is slightly superior to the LOGIR if 
its rate of fire is 9.1 seconds or faster, but because the LOGIR is a fire-and-forget missile 
that does not require lasing of the target, it is much more likely that the LOGIR will be 
able to maintain a higher rate of fire.   
3. What Factor Is Most Important in Deciding Which Missile to Select? 
The regression analysis of each missile and its factors show that that most 
statistically significant factor is the rate of fire.  The Pk of the NLOS is statistically 
significant but that is most likely due to the broad range of Pk that was used for NLOS in 
the experiment.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this thesis support the following recommendations: 
• The Navy should continue the development of the LOGIR and APKWS 
• The DAGR is a viable alternative if the costs rise for LOGIR and APKWS 
• The Navy should continue with the development of the NLOS-LS and 
PAM.   
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• When looking at future missile systems, the rate of fire should be the most 
important deciding factor, within reason.  A missile system that has a high 
rate of fire but only four missiles would not be very beneficial and neither 
would a missile system that has a high rate of fire but a very poor hit 
probability.   
• Tactics should allow for the LCS to use its speed and maneuverability, 
when conditions permit, to keep the distance between it and the enemy 
combatants beyond the enemy’s detection and/or weapons’ range and use 
LCS’s aircraft and over-the-horizon capabilities to defeat the enemy 
without exposing the LCS to direct harm.   
 
C. FUTURE WORK 
While working on this thesis the following items were identified as warranting 
further research.   
• Work the missile defense capability of LCS into the simulation.   
• Include aircraft and subsurface threats into the simulation.   
• Rework the scenario in SimKit and compare the results. 
• Conduct a cost benefits analysis on which options provide the best 
combination of combat effectiveness and low cost. 
• Investigate effects of communications failures between the LCS and the 
aircraft on their combat effectiveness.   
• Rework the scenario to include the frontrunners of the Navy’s next 
generation long-range anti-ship missile program.   
• Look into the implications of this research and what it might mean for 
LCS tactics in the SUW environment.  
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• Test the different LCS and aircraft missile combinations in situations 
involving different tactics on the part of Blue and Red forces to further test 
the effectiveness of the different missile systems.   
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APPENDIX B.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS  
This appendix illustrates the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) used to 
conduct the simulation experiment.  Due to the size of the full designs, only the first 50 
rows are provided.   




B. UAV SCENARIO DESIGN 
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